这个I2P的实现（本网站上发布的Java实现）包含了一份“危险国家名单”，我们用它来决定路由器在一些使用类似I2P的应用可能受法律限制的国家该怎么做。例如，虽然据我们所知没有任何国家禁止使用I2P，但有些却对参与为他人路由有着广泛限制。看起来像在危险国家的路由器将自动进入“隐藏”模式。
本项目依靠公民权利和数字权利组织提供的研究，以做出为其用户提供保护的决策。在这里，参考了Freedom House提供的正在进行的研究。大体方针是包括公民自由（Civil Liberties, CL）分数在16分或以下的，或互联网自由分数在39或以下（非自由）的国家。
隐藏模式摘要
When a router is placed into hidden mode, three key things change about its behavior. It will no longer publish a routerInfo to the NetDB, it will no longer accept participating tunnels, and it will reject direct connections to routers in the same country that it is in. These defenses make the routers more difficult to enumerate reliably, and prevent them from running afoul of restrictions on routing traffic for others.
Strict Countries List as of 2024
/* Afghanistan */ "AF",
/* Azerbaijan */ "AZ",
/* Bahrain */ "BH",
/* Belarus */ "BY",
/* Brunei */ "BN",
/* Burundi */ "BI",
/* Cameroon */ "CM",
/* Central African Republic */ "CF",
/* Chad */ "TD",
/* China */ "CN",
/* Cuba */ "CU",
/* Democratic Republic of the Congo */ "CD",
/* Egypt */ "EG",
/* Equatorial Guinea */ "GQ",
/* Eritrea */ "ER",
/* Ethiopia */ "ET",
/* Iran */ "IR",
/* Iraq */ "IQ",
/* Kazakhstan */ "KZ",
/* Laos */ "LA",
/* Libya */ "LY",
/* Myanmar */ "MM",
/* North Korea */ "KP",
/* Palestinian Territories */ "PS",
/* Pakistan */ "PK",
/* Rwanda */ "RW",
/* Saudi Arabia */ "SA",
/* Somalia */ "SO",
/* South Sudan */ "SS",
/* Sudan */ "SD",
/* Eswatini (Swaziland) */ "SZ",
/* Syria */ "SY",
/* Tajikistan */ "TJ",
/* Thailand */ "TH",
/* Turkey */ "TR",
/* Turkmenistan */ "TM",
/* Venezuela */ "VE",
/* United Arab Emirates */ "AE",
/* Uzbekistan */ "UZ",
/* Vietnam */ "VN",
/* Western Sahara */ "EH",
/* Yemen */ "YE"